## Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 RABAT 03092 01 OF 02 261759Z

41

**ACTION SS-25** 

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W

----- 066015

O P 261715Z JUN 75

FM AMEMBASSY RABAT

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5797

INFO AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY DAKAR PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY

SECRETSECTION 1 OF 2 RABAT 3092

**EXDIS** 

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR PBOR MO SS SP

SUBJECT: SPANISH SAHARA: JUNE 25 CONVERSATION WITH KING

REF: A. STATE 145951; B. MADRID 4271; C. MADRID 4311; D. RABAT 2698; E. STATE 149125

1. SUMMARY: KING HASSAN CALLED ME IN ON DAY'S NOTICE FOR "UNOFFICIAL" DISCUSSION JUNE 25. HE NOTED THAT SOME OF HIS ADVISORS HAD BEEN CONCERNED OVER U.S. STATEMENT ISSUED IN MADRID EMPHASIZING NEUTRALITY ON SAHARA (REF A), BUT STRESSED THAT HE PERSONALLY VIEWED THE STATEMENT AS "ROUTINE." KING SEEMED SATISFIED WITH MY EXPLANATION THAT THE STATEMENT, REPEATING KNOWN US POLICY, HAD BEEN ISSUED IN WAKE OF MADRID PRESS ALLEGATIONS IN ORDER TO SET RECORD STRAIGHT. KING REACTED BY REITERATING FULL CONFIDENCE IN SECRETARY. HE WENT ON TO EXPRESS VEHEMENT EXASPERATION WITH SPAIN OVER SAHARA ISSUE AND STRONG SUSPICION OF SPANISH-ALGERIAN COLLUSION AGAINST MOROCCO. I USED OCCASION TO VOICE CONCERN OVER RECENT GUERRILLA UPSURGE AND TO URGE FULL EXPLORATION OF SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 RABAT 03092 01 OF 02 261759Z

AVAILABLE DIPLOMATIC POSSIBILITIES. KING INDICATED HIS CURRENT

MOOD ON FOUR-POWER (SPANISH-MOROCCAN-MAURITANIAN-ALGERIAN)
TALKS WAS RATHER NEGATIVE, CITING UNHELPFUL SPANISH ATTITUDE AND
RISK SPAIN AND ALGERIA WOULD GANG UP ON MOROCCO. ONLY IF ALGERIA
COULD BE KEPT UNDER CONTROL DID HE SEE POSSIBILITY OF TALKS GETTING
UNDER WAY. COMMENT: KING'S MOOD DOES NOT AUGUR WELL FOR
FOUR-POWER TALKS, ALTHOUGH HE WAS CAREFUL TO KEEP DOOR SLIGHTLY
AJAR. KING AT SAME TIME CLEARLY PLACES CONSIDERABLE STOCK IN
POSSIBILITY OF HELPFUL U.S. ROLE. END SUMMARY

2. KING RECEIVED ME AT SKHIRAT SUMMER PALACE EVENING JUNE 25, HAVING SENT WORD PREVIOUS EVENING HE WANTED TO SEE ME. KING WAS IN RIDING CLOTHES, LOOKING FIT AND AT EASE. UNDERLINING "UNOFFICIAL" NATURE OF DISCUSSION, HE SAID HIS PURPOSE WAS TO ASK ABOUT STATEMENT ISSUED IN MADRID EMPHASIZING US NEUTRALITY ON SAHARA ISSUE. STATEMENT HAD UPSET A NUMBER OF HIS AIDES, SOME OF WHOM WERE ALWAYS SUSPICIOUS OF AMERICA AND, HE HINTED DARKLY, PERHAPS NOT TOTALLY DISINTERESTED. KING EMPHASIZED HE PERSONALLY VIEWED STATEMENT AS RELATIVELY ROUTINE, I EXPLAINED, DRAWING ON REFS B AND C, THAT FOLLOWING SECRETARY'S INTERVIEW IN US NEWS AND WORLD REPORT AND MEETING WITH UNSYG WALDHEIM, SPANISH PRESS HAD ALLEGED THAT SECRETARY HAD MADE STATEMENT OF

US SUPPORT FOR MOROCCO'S SAHARA CLAIM. I COMMENTED I COULD NOT IMAGINE WHERE SUCH IDEA HAD ORIGINATED AND MY STUDY OF INTERVIEW IN QUESTION REVEALED NO REFERENCE WHATSOEVER TO SAHARA. IN ANY CASE, NATURE OF ALLEGATIONS HAD LED EMBASSY MADRID AND USG TO SET RECORD STRAIGHT, WHICH HAD BEEN DONE BY REPETITION OF PREVIOUSLY STATED US POSITION, WITH WHICH KING ALREADY FAMILIAR.

- 3. I WENT ON TO ASSURE KING THAT HIS STATEMENTS MADE TO ME AND FRENCH AMBASSADOR JUNE 5 (REF D) (NOTAL) WERE RECEIVING SERIOUS ATTENTION ON HIGHEST LEVELS IN WASHINGTON. I ALSO ALLUDED TO HEAVY BURDEN OF NUMEROUS POLICY ISSUES BEING EXAMINED IN WASHINGTON AT PRESENT TIME AND EXPRESSED VIEW IT IN NO ONE'S INTEREST TO PRESS FOR OVERLY RAPID DECISIONS ON COMPLEX SUBJECTS AND THAT IT BETTER TO ALLOW ORDERLY AND THOUGHTFUL PROCESS TO BEAR FRUIT. I UNDERLINED THAT I WAS NOT SEEKING TO IMPLY EITHER THAT THERE WOULD BE A CHANGE IN US POLICY OR THAT THERE WOULD NOT.
- 4. KING RESPONDED AMICABLY THAT HE HAD SEEN US MADRID STATEMENT SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 RABAT 03092 01 OF 02 261759Z

IN SAME LIGHT AND THAT MY EXPLANATION WOULD FURTHER STRENGTHEN HIS HAND IN DISCUSSIONS WITH HIS AIDES. HE WENT ON TO ADD, "PLEASE TELL SECRETARY KISSINGER THAT I BELIEVE I KNOW HIM WELL AND THAT I HAVE FULL CONFIDENCE IN HIM; I DO NOT WISH TO PUT PRESSURE ON HIM TO PRODUCE SNAP ANSWER AND I HAVE EVERY CONFIDENCE THAT, AFTER DUE DELIBERATION OF ALL ISSUES INVOLVED, HE WILL FIND A WAY TO HELP US."

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 RABAT 03092 02 OF 02 261811Z

50

**ACTION SS-25** 

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W

----- 066235

O P 261715Z JUN 75

FM AMEMBASSY RABAT

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5798

INFO AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY DAKAR PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 RABAT 3092

## **EXDIS**

- 5. AT THAT POINT, I THOUGHT IT USEFUL TO CHANGE SUBJECT SLIGHTLY AND ASKED FOR KING'S INFORMAL ASSESSMENT OF SAHARA SITUATION, ESPECIALLY IN LIGHT OF LATEST GUERRILLA UPSUREGE. KING, VISIBLY BECOMING SOMEWHAT TENSE, EXPRESSED VEHEMENT EXASPERATION WITH SPANIARDS, WHOSE POLICY HE PROFESSED SIMPLY NOT TO UNDERSTAND. HE REFERRED TO A RECENT STATEMENT BY SPANISH GOVERNOR GENERAL OF SAHARA IN WHICH, ACCORDING TO THE KING, SPANIARD HAD REVEALED THAT SPAIN HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WITH F POLISARIO FOR OVER A YEAR. THIS, KING SAID ANGRILY, UNVEILED THE COLLUSION EXISTING BETWEEN SPAIN AND THE F POLISARIO, OR, IN OTHER WORDS, BETWEEN SPAIN AND ALGERIA. KING DIGRESSED TO SAY THAT HE HAD JUST SPOKEN ON THE TELEPHONE WITH FRENCH PRESIDENT GISCARD, WHO HAD COMMENTED THAT SPANISH FONMIN CORTINA WAS "CRAZY". CORTINA CONSTANTLY SHIFTED FROM EXTREME HARD LINE TO FLEXIBILITY AND BACK AGAIN WITHOUT ANY APPARENT REASON. IT WAS DIFFICULT TO DO BUSINESS WITH SUCH PEOPLE, KING ASSERTED.
- 6. I USED OCCASION TO INTRODUCE NOTE OF MODERATION, GIVING PERSONAL ASSESSMENT THAT WHILE SPANISH ACTIONS MIGHT FLUCTUATE, SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 RABAT 03092 02 OF 02 261811Z

OVERALL TREND SEEMED TO BE TOWARD GRADUAL RAPPROCHEMENT OF THE VIEWS OF MADRID AND RABAT; THEREFORE FULL EXPLORATION OF AVAIL-ABLE DIPLOMATIC POSSIBILITIES APPEARED WORTHWHILE. IN THAT CONNECTION I EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER GUERRILLA UPSURGE IN WHICH LATEST INCIDENT HAD INVOLVED DEATH OF FIVE SPANISH SOLDIERS. A DEVELOPMENT LIKELY TO INFLAME SPANISH EMOTIONS AND MAKE DIPLOMATIC PROGRESS MORE DIFFICULT. KING BRUSHED ASIDE SIGNIFICANCE OF LATEST INCIDENT, SAYING HE DID NOT HAVE ALL THE DETAILS BUT THAT THERE HAD BEEN TWO SEPARATE EVENTS: FLU ATTACK AND EXPLOSION OF MINE SEVERAL DAYS LATER. SUCH THINGS MUST BE EXPECTED TO HAPPEN IN CURRENT SITUATION, HE COMMENTED. MOREOVER, HE ADDED, PRESENT SPANISH ATTITUDE PROVIDED LITTLE GROUND FOR CONFIDENCE. REFERRING TO HIS JUNE 5 REMARKS TO ME ABOUT FOUR-POWER MEETING, KING SAID HIS PRESENT MOOD ON SUBJECT WAS RATHER NEGATIVE: HIS UNDERSTANDING OF SPANISH ATTITUDE WAS THAT IT NOT HELPFUL. IF FOUR-POWER MEETING ON ANY LEVEL SIMPLY PROVIDED OPPORTUNITY FOR SPAIN AND ALGERIA TO GANG UP ON MOROCCO AND MAURITANIA, KING FELT HE HAD NOTHING TO GAIN AND THAT MATTERS WOULD ONLY GET WORSE. IF, HOWEVER, IT WERE POSSIBLE TO "PUT THE ALGERIANS IN BRACKETS" (I.E., TO KEEP THEM UNDER SOME CONTROL), THE OUTLOOK MIGHT BE BETTER. HOWEVER, KING ADDED, HE DID NOT SEE SPANISH READINESS TO TAKE SUCH AN APPROACH AT THIS TIME.

- 7. COMMENT: KING'S MOOD WAS MORE GRAVE THAN IN OUR JUNE 5 MEETING. HE IS CLEARLY INCREASINGLY FRUSTRATED OVER LACK OF DIPLOMATIC PROGRESS TOWARD MOROCCAN GOALS. HE MAY ALSO BE UNDERESTIMATING RISKS OF ESCALATING GUERRILLA ACTIVITY. HIS SUSPICION OF SPANISH MOTIVES AND PREOCCUPATION WITH SPANISH-ALGERIAN "COLLUSION" DO NOT AUGUR WELL FOR INITIATION OF FOUR-POWER TALKS, ALTHOUGH KING WAS CAREFUL TO LEAVE DOOR SLIGHTLY AJAR SHOULD SOME WAY OF CURBING ALGERIAN ROLE IN TALKS BE FOUND.
- 8. KING SEEMED ASSUAGED BY MY EXPLANATION OF BACKGROUND TO US POLICY CLARIFICATION IN MADRID AND EXHIBITED PATIENCE WITH RESPECT TO AWAITING A US RESPONSE TO HIS JUNE 5 REQUEST FOR US DIPLOMATIC HELP. HE OBVIOUSLY HAS HIS APPEAL TO THE US VERY MUCH IN MIND, HOWEVER, AND SEEMS TO PLACE CONSIDERABLE STOCK IN THE POSSIBILITY OF A HELPFUL US ATTITUDE.

  NEUMANN

SECRET

NNN

## Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994 Channel Indicators: n/a

**Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED** 

Concepts: DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS, TERRITORIAL CLAIMS, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION

Control Number: n/a Copy: SINGLE Draft Date: 26 JUN 1975 Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW Disposition Action: RELEASED Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: GolinoFR
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975RABAT03092

Document Number: 1975RABAT03092 Document Source: CORE Document Unique ID: 00

Drafter: n/a Enclosure: n/a Executive Order: GS Errors: N/A

Film Number: D750222-0424

From: RABAT

Handling Restrictions: n/a

Image Path:

Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t19750613/aaaaaloc.tel Line Count: 213

Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

Office: ACTION SS

**Original Classification: SECRET** Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS Original Previous Classification: n/a Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a

Page Count: 4

Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET

Previous Glassinications: EXDIS
Reference: 75 STATE 145951, 75 MADRID 4271, 75 MADRID 4311
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: GolinoFR

Review Comment: n/a Review Content Flags: Review Date: 21 MAY 2003

**Review Event:** 

Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <21 MAY 2003 by MartinML>; APPROVED <22 MAY 2003 by GolinoFR>

**Review Markings:** 

Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 06 JÚL 2006

**Review Media Identifier:** Review Referrals: n/a Review Release Date: n/a Review Release Event: n/a **Review Transfer Date:** 

Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a

Secure: OPEN Status: NATIVE

Subject: SPANISH SAHARA: JUNE 25 CONVERSATION WITH KING TAGS: PFOR, PBOR, MO, SS, SP, (HASSAN II)
To: STATE

Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 06 JUL 2006